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1 Abstract
Several philosophical accounts of disease are constructed around the idea that
disease is a failure of physiological parts or processes to perform their biological
function. Determining whether a phenotype—such as obesity—is a disease or
determining the level of functioning at which some aspect of physiology—such
as response to insulin—becomes pathological throws considerable weight on the
concept of biological function. However, there are a number of philosophical
theories of biological function, each of which defines function differently. It is
not clear which theory, or combination of theories, we should use to explicate
the medical conception of function. We have no systematic way to determine
how biologists and medical practitioners conceive of, or write about, function in
their respective disciplines. To further complicate matters, natural language is
replete with ambiguities, and scientific manuscripts often use terms imprecisely.
Without a descriptive understanding of how different conceptions of function are
used in biology and medicine, we have little hope of bringing insights about bio-
logical function to bear on disputes about function and malfunction in medicine.
Here we develop a systematic method for analysing references to function by
outlining a classification scheme that combines syntactic and semantic analysis
in a dependency-grammar framework.
2 Introduction
Much of philosophy of medicine is concerned with issues surrounding the con-
cept of disease. Philosophical approaches to categorising disease can be broadly
divided into two camps: a normativist view that prioritises social value judge-
ments and a naturalist view that prioritises biological theory.1 The former
1There are also hybrid views, such as Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction account [1].
1
contends that judgements about disease should be primarily based on whether
society disvalues the condition in question, whereas the latter holds that our
categorisation of disease should be primarily based on whether “something has
gone wrong” in a biological system [2] . But what does it mean for “something
to go wrong” with a biological system according to the naturalist view?
Before determining what it means for “something to go wrong”, one requires
a normative framework that can be used to determine what a biological com-
ponent (trait) ought to do . To ground normative claims in biology, many nat-
uralist accounts defer to the notion of function. If a trait’s function is what the
trait ought to do, then a dysfunctional trait no longer does what the trait ought
to do [3]. But herein lies several problems. Function is a word with multiple
senses in both its colloquial and discipline-specific uses. Within the discipline
of philosophy, there are many theories of biological function, each differing in
their claims to normativity (and some with arguably no normative claims what-
soever). In more applied disciplines, such as biology, medical research, and
clinical medicine, it can be unclear which concept of function is being employed
or how well usage maps onto philosophical conceptions of function.
Experimental philosophy relies, in large part, on extracting meaning from
natural language. If we hope to use experimental philosophy to understand a
naturalistic account of disease and dysfunction, we must first clarify how the
concept of function (and dysfunction) is used in natural language. One must
solve two broad problems in order to consistently disambiguate real-world usage
of biological function. First, one must develop a classification scheme compris-
ing a set of categories, each of which defines a sense (or concept) of function.
The categories within the set should be exhaustive, covering all possible real-
world uses of function. Furthermore, the categories should either be exclusive
(i.e. each use of function has one and only one sense) or there should be ex-
plicit rules for how one is to deal with membership in overlapping categories
(e.g. a hierarchy of definitions or allowing of multiple senses for a single usage).
Second, one must develop a system that can consistently assign a piece of nat-
ural language on biological function (sentence, paragraph, etc.) into its correct
category.
The problem of developing a set of categories will typically employ some form
of conceptual analysis (and/or leverage earlier conceptual analysis). We cannot,
however, simply paste together existing concepts of biological function. For one,
this will not necessarily generate a set of function concepts that are exhaustive
or exclusive.2 Moreover, real-world usage of function does not always align with
philosophical concepts of function. A classification scheme for experimental
2For an example with respect to exclusivity, consider the two partially overlapping con-
cepts of the causal role [4] and organisational theories [5] of function. We must make some
hard decisions when deciding how to incorporate these concepts into a coherent classification
scheme. We could choose one category and remove the other, allow both but give one hierar-
chical precedence over the other when ambiguities arise, allow a single usage to be assigned to
both categories, create one category that encompasses both concepts, or create more general
categories that do not align perfectly with one or more of the philosophical concepts. (Here
we have chosen the latter, as references to organisational theories may be split over Biological
Role and Biological Advantage.)
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philosophy will thus necessarily be an amalgamation of philosophical conceptual
analysis and discipline-specific usage [6] .
A study by Keeling et. al. has recently attempted this for biological function
in the context of de novo gene emergence [7] . The authors chose six categories
for their classification scheme: Evolutionary Implications, Physiological Impli-
cations, Interactions, Capacities, Expression, and Vague. The authors started
broadly with the two most well-known philosophical concepts of function: causal
role and selected effects. From this base, they iterated through a small dataset
of 42 instances (from 20 abstracts), adding categories and refining the scheme
as they encountered new usages that did not fit into the existing scheme. They
achieve an exhaustive scheme by implementing a catch-all category of Vague
for usage unable to be categorised in one of the other five categories. They
did not require that these categories be mutually exclusive, instead allowing a
single usage to have membership in multiple categories. To categorise each us-
age of function using the scheme, the authors started by independently reading
a paper’s title and abstract. Next they used a list of definitions to assign at
least one meaning of function to the example, which was supplemented by a few
general coding rules to guide application of the definitions. One of the most
striking findings from this study was the difficulty of obtaining agreement be-
tween the different raters: in only 12% of cases did all four raters independently
assign an example to the same category!3 After conferring with one another
and employing a consensus-based approach, the raters were still only able to
assign 62% of cases to a single category [7] . Despite having a comprehensive
and well-reasoned classification scheme in hand, these authors were not able to
consistently categorise real-world usages of function into a single category. This
is clearly an immensely difficult problem to solve, and there are likely a number
of factors that contributed to the difficulty in unambiguously assigning usages
of function to a single concept. We suggest, however, that a crucial factor lies
in the different ways that individual investigators analyse natural language in
order to extract meaning. Without a detailed and standardised framework, the
semantic mapping from natural language to a definition of function is bound to
be inconsistent among different investigators.
In this manuscript, we ask a similar question to Keeling et. al. [7] but adopt
a different methodology. Our categories are more closely aligned to philosophical
concepts of function than those of Keeling et. al. [7] who intentionally developed
more specific categories for de novo gene function. Our classification scheme also
does not try to semantically map directly from natural language to definitions
of function. To assign an example to a definition, one instead follows a step-by-
step flowchart, answering questions and identifying important features related
to function that are contained within natural language that references function.
We unpack each piece of natural language into one of several common forms. For
3In addition, the authors used 17 of the 20 abstracts to develop their classification scheme,
meaning that their reported level of agreement—which was based on all 20 abstracts—is
almost certainly higher than they would achieve on a novel set of abstracts about de novo
gene function (in the parlance of statistics and machine learning, their reported result is
“overfit” on account of them using the same data for “training” and “testing”).
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example, to be classified as Biological Role (see section 3.1), an investigator must
be able to identify each variable in the unpacked form of “The function of ITEM
is EFFECT in SYSTEM ” (e.g. ITEM could be “The heart”, EFFECT could be
“to pump blood through”, and SYSTEM could be “the circulatory system”). By
simplifying natural language into simple, common forms, our approach avoids
obfuscation of meaning due to variation in syntactic construction and helps
standardise the technique for extracting meaning. Moreover, we provide detailed
instructions for how to use the dependency grammar framework and modern
natural language processing techniques as aids in identifying the variables in
the unpacked forms.
3 Classification scheme
Our approach was to analyse real-world uses of biological function extracted
from scientific papers. Since our focus was on how function is used in biology,
we used examples from a wide variety of biological subfields. We used the
Australian Research Council Field of Research codes to identify the following
biological subfields: biochemistry and cell biology, ecology, evolutionary biology,
genetics, microbiology, physiology, plant biology, and zoology. We matched
these subfields to the following fields from Clarivate Analytic’s Web of Science
database: biochemistry and molecular biology, ecology, evolutionary biology,
genetics and heredity, microbiology, physiology, plant sciences, and zoology. In
addition, we considered the general biology category and the general science
category. We used Clarivate Analytic’s Journal Impact Factor (JIF) to get a
ranking of journals, and for each category, we chose the top five journals by
JIF (supplementary material: journal list). We searched within Web of Science
using the search string “function*” for journals from the biological subfield
categories and “biolog* AND function*” for journals from the general biology
and general science categories. We chose the first listed paper from each journal,
and we extracted all sentences involving a use of function from the full texts
(ignoring abstracts), giving us 1316 usages of function that we used to develop
our scheme.
Developing a classification scheme is a difficult proposition, as the process
unavoidably involves circularity: in order to create a scheme that can classify
examples, we first need a set of classified examples that we can use to test and
iteratively develop the scheme. How can we confidently classify examples be-
fore we have a scheme to classify examples? We used two main methods to
obtain a set of “gold-standard” examples that we could use to help develop our
scheme. In the first method, three of the authors (JRC, ZW, SAG) indepen-
dently analysed a subset of the sentences using definitions and a simple set of
classification guidelines (much like the approach taken in Keeling et. al. [7]).
We then compared our responses, and if our classifications differed, we used a
consensus-based approach to categorise examples. Those examples that all of us
were confident about formed a set of gold-standard examples. A disadvantage
of using a consensus-based approach is that we can never be sure of the author’s
4
intentions, even in examples that we confidently and unanimously categorised.
The second method we used was to simplify real sentences that we encoun-
tered, using these examples as a base from which to write (and rewrite) our
own sentences. Say we have a sentence that we decide (through consensus) is
used in the sense of Biological Role. We can simplify the sentence and rewrite it
using different syntactic structures (but retaining the sense of Biological Role).
Moreover, we can change the sentence such that it now instead expresses Bio-
logical Advantage (and again rewrite it multiple times using different syntactic
structures). This approach has two main benefits over the consensus-based ap-
proach: (i) with these examples we know with certainty the author’s intentions,
having purposefully written them ourselves to fit a specific category; and (ii) by
exploring different syntactic structures, we help ensure that our classification
scheme is robust to alternate phrasings. In addition to obtaining these gold-
standard examples, we also set aside interesting cases that were problematic
to classify. We iteratively modified our classification scheme so as to handle
these problematic cases and other generally problematic patterns that arose re-
peatedly (altering the flowchart, adding new categories, modifying the natural
language analysis, and so on).
3.1 Senses of function
The first step was to choose the categories of our classification scheme. We
decided to use the scheme of Wouters (2003) as our starting point [6] . Wouters
breaks down function into four categories: (i) Biological Activity; (ii) Biological
Role; (iii) Biological Advantage; and (iv) Selected Effect. In Wouters’s scheme,
Biological Activity is “what an item does or is capable of doing”, Biological
Role describes “how a certain item or activity contributes to the emergence of a
complex capacity of an organism”, Biological Advantage refers to the “biological
value (utility) of a certain trait in comparison with another”, and Selected Effect
is “used in a historical sense to refer to the effects for which a certain trait was
selected in the past” [6] .
We added a new category of function whenever we encountered instances
of usage that reoccurred multiple times and could not be classified in one of
our existing categories. To Biological Activity, Biological Role, Biological Ad-
vantage, and Selected Effect, we added the following categories: Colloquial,
Technical, and To Work. In some instances, the sentence does not contain suf-
ficient information to identify all the variables. We thus added the following
additional categories whose purpose is to specify which feature is missing from
the sentence: Description Incomplete: ITEM Unspecified, Description Incom-
plete: EFFECT Unspecified, and Description Incomplete: EFFECT Specified.
The classification scheme flowchart is shown in Figure 1 and descriptions of the
decision points are in Table 1.
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Figure 1: Decision flowchart for identifying sense of function. Red
arrows with label “N” indicate that the question is answered “no”; green arrows
with label “Y” indicate that the question is answered “yes”. See Table 1 for a
description of each decision point.
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Table 1: Description of each decision point in the classification flowchart (Figure 1).
Decision point Description
Biological context? Are we dealing with a case of biological function or colloquial use (see WordNet 3.1 for colloquial definitions)? Colloquial examples
are rare if one restricts the corpus to scientific papers in biology. Notable exceptions are mathematical functions and programming
functions, which we place within Colloquial to simplify the flowchart.
Technical use? Compound phrases such as “functional ecology”, “functional biology”, “functional connectivity”, and so on. These phrases will be
familiar to practitioners within a field. Their meanings are multi-faceted and influenced by a field’s development and cannot be
meaningfully unpacked using a flowchart. These phrases will often appear multiple times in a manuscript.
Identify ITEM An ITEM is something that can be a character or trait (or produced by one) of a Darwinian individual. Obvious candidates are
concrete nouns, which refer to a physical item (e.g. heart), but it also includes abstract nouns if they refer to a concrete concept
(e.g. “gene” as used in population genetics, “boldness” as a behavioural phenotype, etc.). Importantly, there must be a grammatical
dependency between function and the ITEM—it is not sufficient that a suitable ITEM simply appear in the sentence (e.g. “protein”
is the ITEM in “protein function aids muscle development” but “muscle” is the ITEM in “protein aids in muscle function”).
Identify ITEM ’s EF-
FECT
EFFECT is what the ITEM does (or, less commonly, has done to it). EFFECT is a verb or verb phrase, or it is a word or phrase
that can be converted into a verb (e.g. “contribute to transcription” could be converted to the verb “transcribe”). EFFECT must
be a mechanistic action or effect of the ITEM (e.g. if ITEM is “gene” then “is transcribed” is acceptable but “benefits health” is
not).
Is function used in the
sense of To Work?
A heuristic is whether you can substitute “ITEM function” (or equivalent, depending on the sentence) with “how well ITEM
performs”, “a working ITEM ”, or similar into the raw sentence without loss of meaning. For example, “Liver function is important
for health” might become “A working liver is important for health” without loss of meaning.
Did doing EFFECT se-
lect for ITEM histori-
cally?
Can it fit the following form: the function of ITEM is to EFFECT such that doing EFFECT in the past caused ITEM to be selected
or maintained in a population (relative to an actual or counterfactual historical alternative to ITEM )? An example would be “zebra
stripes are functional because they evolved to reduce insect bites” as reducing insect bites (EFFECT ) has selected for zebra stripes
(ITEM ).
Identify SYSTEM A SYSTEM is either a Darwinian individual, or a complex system within an individual, that contains the ITEM. The EFFECT of
the ITEM on the SYSTEM contributes to a capacity of the SYSTEM. As a heuristic for identifying the SYSTEM, you can ask “how
does ITEM produce EFFECT?” or “for what is ITEM producing EFFECT used?”.





Consider “Transcript X functions to regulate expression in the liver, which improves liver performance through regulation of glycogen
storage.”. We can unpack this as “The function of TRANSCRIPT X is to REGULATE EXPRESSION in GLYCOGEN STOR-
AGE IN THE LIVER and REGULATING EXPRESSION benefits [improves performance of] THE LIVER”. Note the statement’s
contrastive nature: “improves liver performance” indicates that transcript X is being compared to an (unstated) alternative (e.g.
transcript Y). Although contrast will often occur, it is not required. For example, we would still classify this example as Biological
Advantage if we replaced “improves liver performance” with “aids metabolic control”. Although this alteration removes the contrast,
it nevertheless describes a benefit to a supersystem (metabolic system). (A SUPERSYSTEM is a system that contains SYSTEM up
to and including the level of a Darwinian individual.)
Is the function of
ITEM EFFECT in
SYSTEM ?
Biological Role is not contrastive, and it does not contain language indicating a benefit to a system (or supersystem). An example
is “Transcript X functions to regulate expression in the liver, which plays a role in regulation of glycogen storage”. This statement
neither contrasts transcript X with an alternative—it simply describes how transcript X contributes to a capacity of the SYSTEM—
nor explicitly describes a benefit to the SYSTEM.
Is the function of ITEM
EFFECT?
Biological Activity is Biological Role without a SYSTEM being specified. An example is “Transcript X functions to regulate
expression”, which simply describes what transcript X does. We do not know how (or in what system) it is being used.
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3.2 Biological Activity, Role, and Advantage
The categories of Biological Activity, Biological Role, and Biological Advantage
are conceptually related. The relationship between Biological Activity and Role
is straightforward: a Biological Role is a Biological Activity that contributes to
the capacity of an organism (or, more generally, to the capacity of a system).
The difference between Biological Role and Biological Advantage is summed up,
in Wouters’s words, by “a distinction between ’how it is used’ (role) and ’how
it is useful’ (advantage)” [6] . We can thus think of Biological Advantage as a
Biological Role that benefits an organism by virtue of contributing to a capacity
of a system (of that organism).
We classify these three categories in a hierarchical manner, such that Ad-
vantage > Role > Activity. By this we mean that if an example is classified
as Biological Advantage, it has also satisfied the criteria for Role and Activ-
ity, and if classified as Role, then it has also satisfied the criteria for Activity.
There are three benefits behind our approach: (i) it neatly captures the rela-
tion between these categories within the context of our classification process, as
each category is associated with identifying additional feature(s) (ITEM and
EFFECT for the base category of Biological Activity, SYSTEM for Biological
Role, and a benefit of EFFECT toward SYSTEM (or SUPERSYSTEM ) for Bi-
ological Advantage); (ii) it is an effective method for developing a classification
with mutually-exclusive categories (there would be significant overlap without
a hierarchical system, e.g. every Biological Role would also be a Biological Ac-
tivity); and (iii) it allows for categories to be easily combined post hoc if desired
(see next section for an example).
3.2.1 Biological Activity
Biological Activity answers the question “what does it do?”. It was first de-
scribed by Neander as “minimal function” [3] . It deals with biological characters
(e.g. a biological item, feature, or behaviour), describing what these characters
do (or are capable of doing) [6] . It has received relatively little philosophical
attention, likely because a statement of Biological Activity leaves out important
information about how the character is used or why it exists. Indeed, Biological
Activity is often ignored or subsumed under Biological Role, with the resulting
category typically being termed “causal role” function [4] . We have chosen to
keep this distinction for two main reasons. We believe that Biological Activ-
ity does reflect some actual biological use [6], notably in the ENCODE study
whose goal was to map functionality across the human genome [8].4 Second,
keeping the distinction preserves information. If an investigator believes that
the distinction between Biological Activity and Role is spurious, then they can
always combine (labelled examples of) the two categories into a single category
4It is often stated that ENCODE used a causal role definition (e.g. [9]), but we believe this
to be a conflation of Biological Activity and Biological Role. ENCODE focused on correlates
of biological activity (encoding protein or non-coding RNA, or displaying a biological signature
such as protein binding or a specific chromatin structure) without trying to establish how this
activity is used to generate a complex capacity in the wider system.
8
during the analysis phase. But one cannot separate these categories post hoc if
they were originally classified as a single category.
3.2.2 Biological Role
Biological Role answers the question “how is it used?”. It is closely linked to
causal role or mechanistic theories of function (e.g. [4]). Like Activity, it deals
with biological characters [6], describing how a character’s effect can contribute
to a capacity of a complex system. In addition to causal theories, some real-
world uses of organisational theories of function will likely fall under Biological
Role. Organisational theories differ from causal theories in that they use the
notion of a closed and differentiated self-maintaining organisation as a basis for
teleology and normativity [5]. But organisational theories might be classified
as Biological Role if the self-maintenance aspect is omitted or downplayed in a
particular usage.
3.2.3 Biological Advantage
Biological Advantage answers the question “how does it help?”. This use of func-
tion encompasses a range of different philosophical theories and labels (e.g. it is
called “fitness-contribution” in [10] and “Biological Advantage” in [6]; it is also
closely linked to dispositional theories of function, such as [11]). In Wouters’s
characterisation, Biological Advantage deals with traits (specific variants of a
character), and it is contrastive in nature, describing how a trait’s effect has ben-
efits relative to an alternative trait [6]. Wouters’s interpretation of advantage is
somewhat more general than the aforementioned theories that focus explicitly
on fitness benefits for Darwinian individuals. Wouters’s definition requires that
an ITEM demonstrate biological value (or utility) over an alternative. While
Wouters states that the ultimate benchmark for biological value is fitness, he
acknowledges that Biological Advantage statements may simply describe “the
efficiency with which a certain biological role is performed”. In these sorts of
statements, there is an implicit assumption that improved efficiency of this role
benefits the individual, and that it does so in such a way that it correlates with
fitness. This approach will thus include false-positives in cases where the benefits
identified correlate poorly with fitness. In practice, this means that Wouters’s
characterisation of Biological Advantage is quite permissive, being satisfied if
an organism can do EFFECT better with ITEM than with an alternative trait
[11] .
Some have argued, in opposition to Wouters, that Biological Advantage need
not be contrastive (or be limited to dealing with traits), instead focusing on how
it contributes to survival [10, 12]. There are obvious parallels between a non-
contrastive view of Biological Advantage and organisational theories of function,
which focus on how an ITEM ’s EFFECT contributes to self-maintenance [a
non-contrastive benefit] of a SYSTEM. With this in mind, we take a very gen-
eral view of Biological Advantage, adopting Wouters’s permissive interpretation
of biological advantage as improving a biological role’s efficiency, but making it
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even more permissive by not requiring that the characterisation be contrastive.
For our purposes, any explicit mention of a benefit to a system of a Darwinian
individual is sufficient for an example to be categorised as Biological Advantage
instead of Biological Role. Usages of organisational theories explicitly mention-
ing the benefits of self-maintenance will thus fall under Biological Advantage (as
mentioned previously, those usages of organisational theories that omit explicit
references to the benefits of self-maintenance will likely fall under Biological
Role).
3.3 Function as To Work
We identify another common use of function, namely that of To Work. In our
flowchart, this use of function can only arise when the EFFECT of an ITEM is
not specified (Figure 1). This use has an analog in one of the colloquial senses
of function, namely “to work as expected”. Function as To Work is primarily
concerned with how an item has developed in individuals, and whether it is
deemed to be functional (in the sense of working as expected) or dysfunctional
(not working as expected). This use of function differs from Biological Activity,
Role, Advantage, and Selected Effect, which are all “type” level designations
(dealing with lineages of characters or traits). Function as To Work instead
focuses on token level ascriptions (traits of individuals), and it is concerned
with the development and manifestation of traits or systems in individuals.5
An example of this usage is “liver function is important for an individual’s
health”. Here function does not refer to a function of the liver (e.g. “the liver
functions to store glycogen”), but to the functioning of the liver. We could, for
example, express the same meaning in the revised phrase “a liver that works
as expected is important for an individual’s health”. An item that “works as
expected” is one that aligns with the naturalist view of “healthy” or “absence
of disease”. It implies that there exists a normative basis for believing how the
item ought to function. The normative basis might derive from a philosophical
theory, such as selected effects or an organisational theory, but it might have
another basis entirely. Consider a statement such as “The gene is transcribed
and thus is functional”. What is the normative basis behind this statement? It
appears to adopt some form of a Biological Activity definition, namely that for
function it is sufficient that a gene (item) is transcribed (effect) without regard
for how it is used within a system. There might be an explicit set of criteria be-
hind this definition—as in the ENCODE project [8] —but frequently the appeal
to normativity will be implicit (and its justification may be less than sound).
In the statement above, the author may simply have a vague sense that any
gene that does something is functional, perhaps as a complement to the notion
5Of course, dysfunctions are also applied to groups of individuals by virtue of being cat-
egorised into diseases or syndromes. But to the degree that diseases or syndromes cluster
traits and systems, they primarily do so based on similarities in how or why “things have
gone wrong” rather than on lineages of characters or traits. (There are, admittedly, some dif-
ficult cases, such as genetic disorders like mitochondrial disease, in which a disease will cluster
traits in a manner more akin to Selected Effect lineages. In these cases, the line between novel
type traits and dysfunctional token traits becomes blurred.)
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that a non-functional gene is one that does nothing. Few scientific papers that
use “function” explicitly define it, making it difficult to infer a normative basis
in short pieces of natural language. For the To Work category, we focus on
whether a normative basis is expressed by the author’s language. The refer-
ence to function may itself indicate the normative basis, as with “dysfunction”,
“malfunction”, “loss of function”, and so on. But oftentimes the appeal to nor-
mativity will be more subtle. For practical reasons, we choose to be agnostic as
to how the normative basis is constructed.
4 Analysis of natural language
Function has many derivatives (e.g. functional) and can be used in different
parts of speech (noun, verb, etc.), which significantly complicates analysis of
natural language. If we focus just on the forms of function when used as a noun,
we have the singular “function” (“the function of the heart”), and the plural
“functions” (“the heart has many functions”), and the derivative “functionality”
(“the functionality of the heart”). Grammatical relations also vary. In “the
function of the heart” and “the functionality of the heart”, function is the
subject, whereas for “the heart has many functions”, function is the direct
object. Aside from its use as a noun, “functions” (and “function”) can also
be used as a verb (“the heart functions to pump blood”). We also encounter
cases such as the gerund form “functioning”, which is the -ing form of the verb
“function” that acts as a noun (“functioning is important for hearts”). To
further complicate matters, “functioning” might be a present participle instead
of a gerund, in which case it either acts as an adjective (“the functioning heart”)
or to form verb tense (“the heart was functioning”). Suffice it to say, when
dealing with real-world sentences, the sheer variety of syntactical forms present
a challenge for semantic interpretation of function. A central component of our
approach is to simplify these diverse syntactic constructions into the common
forms highlighted in Figure 1 and Table 1.
To simplify comparison of syntactically-diverse constructions, we use word
conversion to convert from derivations of function (e.g. functional) to its mor-
pheme form “function”. We will use morphological derivation to convert be-
tween parts of speech (e.g. adjective to noun) and inflection to convert between
number, tense, and aspect (e.g. the plural “functions” to “function”). Dur-
ing conversion, it is crucial that we retain the syntactic dependencies between
the reference to function and other parts of speech, as these form the basis for
identifying the variables in the unpacked form (ITEM, EFFECT, etc.). We
use a grammatical framework called dependency grammar, which structures
grammatical relations as directed links between words [13]. Effectively, these
syntactic dependencies constrain the parts of a sentence that can be chosen as
ITEM, EFFECT, and so on. To see why this is necessary, consider a statement
such as “Protein function aids muscle development”. There is a syntactic de-
pendency between “protein” and “function” (“protein function” is a compound
noun). If we were to ignore syntactic dependencies, then “protein” and “mus-
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cle” would be equally good candidates for the ITEM, as both are biological
items. In this case, “protein” is the correct ITEM due to its dependency with
“function”. If we had chosen “muscle” instead, we would have unintentionally
altered the meaning of the sentence, rendering our analysis of function incorrect.
(In this example, it is trivial to use intuition to see that “protein” should be
the ITEM, but in real natural language it is frequently difficult to establish this
connection through intuition alone.) Our goal is to use syntactic dependencies
(starting from function or its derivative) to unpack a sentence such that the
correct semantic relations can be cast into a standard form.
5 Analysis of function sentences
In this section, we work through six examples using our classification scheme
and natural language analysis. We use the natural language processing soft-
ware spaCy to label parts of speech (noun, verb, and so on) and to generate
the dependency grammar representation [14]. We focus on short toy sentences
to illustrate the framework, giving a general overview of the natural language
analysis without providing the explicit rules. To download the software, to read
the handbook detailing the rules governing the natural language analysis, or to
explore some detailed worked-out examples, see
https://github.com/joshuachristie/function-concepts.
Figure 2: Examples of dependency grammar analysis. (A) Biological
Activity; (B) Biological Role; and (C) Biological Advantage.
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5.1 Biological Activity
Let us work through the flowchart (Figure 1) using the sentence “The transcript
functions to regulate expression” (Figure 2A). Here “functions” is used as a
verb. There is a dependency—represented by an arrow—between functions and
“transcript” (of type nsubj, nominal subject). Given this dependency, and
the fact that “transcript” is a product of a trait of a Darwinian individual, we
can identify “transcript” as the ITEM. There is also a dependency (via xcomp,
a clausal complement) between the verb “functions” and the transitive verb
“to regulate” which takes “expression” as its direct object. Since “to regulate
expression” is what the ITEM does (and it is a mechanistic action or effect),
we can identify it as the EFFECT. There is no language indicating historical
selection, and we cannot identify a SYSTEM. Since we have identified the ITEM
and EFFECT, by following Figure 1 we get the unpacked form “The function of
the TRANSCRIPT [item] is TO REGULATE EXPRESSION [effect]”, which
gives a classification of Biological Activity.
5.2 Biological Role
Consider the sentence “The transcript functions to regulate expression in metabolism.”
(Figure 2B), which differs from the previous one by the addition of the prepo-
sitional phrase “in metabolism” (marked by case). As before, the ITEM is
“transcript” and the EFFECT is “to regulate expression”, and there is no lan-
guage indicating historical selection. Unlike before, there is now a dependency
between “expression” (part of the EFFECT ) and the noun of the prepositional
phrase “metabolism” (via nmod, nominal modifier). (This dependency provides
information about the EFFECT and answers the question “how is it used?”
with “in the metabolic system”.) Since “metabolism” represents a complex sys-
tem (metabolic system) in which the transcript plays a role, we can identify
SYSTEM as “metabolic system”. There is no language that indicates a benefit
to the metabolic system (or a supersystem containing it), and so we unpack it as
“The function of the TRANSCRIPT [item] is TO REGULATE EXPRESSION
[effect] in the METABOLIC SYSTEM [system]”, which gives a classification of
Biological Role.
5.3 Biological Advantage
Now consider the sentence “The transcript functions to regulate expression in
metabolism by improving glycogen storage.” (Figure 2C), which differs from
the previous one by the addition of the adverbial clause modifier “by improv-
ing glycogen storage”. As before, the ITEM is “transcript”, the EFFECT is
“to regulate expression”, the SYSTEM is “metabolic system”, and there is
no language indicating historical selection. The dependency between “regu-
late” (part of the EFFECT ) and this new clause (via advcl, adverbial clause
modifier) indicates that “improving glycogen storage” provides additional in-
formation about (modifies) the EFFECT. With this dependency established,
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we can ask whether the clause “improving glycogen storage” describes how the
EFFECT “to regulate expression” benefits the “metabolic system” (SYSTEM ).
The answer is yes, which means that we can unpack the sentence as “The func-
tion of the TRANSCRIPT [item] is TO REGULATE EXPRESSION [effect] in
the METABOLIC SYSTEM [system] such that REGULATING EXPRESSION
benefits the METABOLIC SYSTEM ”, which gives a classification of Biological
Advantage.
5.4 Selected Effect
Consider the sentence “Zebra stripes are functional as they evolved to reduce
insect bites.” (Figure 3A). Here function is an adjective in the form of “func-
tional”. There is a dependency between functional and “stripes” (via nsubj,
nominal subject). “Stripes” itself has a dependency with “zebra”, as together
they form the compound noun “zebra stripes”. With the dependency estab-
lished, and given that “zebra stripes” is a biological item, we can determine the
ITEM to be “zebra stripes”. Next we need to try and identify the EFFECT.
From “are functional” there is an adverbial clause modifier (advcl) connected to
the verb “evolved”. We next ask whether “evolved” is a mechanistic action we
can ascribe to the ITEM in a biological system, to which we answer no. There
is, however, an additional dependency from “evolved” to the transitive verb
“reduce” (which takes the compound noun “insect bites” as its direct object).
There is thus a dependency between “are functional” and the phrase “reduce
insect bites” (via the verb “evolved”). We can now ask whether “reduce insect
bites” describes a mechanistic action or effect of the ITEM “zebra stripes”,
to which we answer yes and thus ascribe “reduce insect bites” to EFFECT.
With the ITEM and EFFECT now established, the next question in Figure 1
is whether doing EFFECT selected for ITEM historically. We answer yes, given
the clause “as they evolved”, which gives a classification of Selected Effect.
5.5 To Work
Consider the sentence “Liver function benefits human health.” (Figure 3B).
Here “function” is a noun. There is a dependency between “function” and
“liver” (together they form a compound noun), and thus we can designate “liver”
as the ITEM. Next we must find the EFFECT. There is a dependency between
“function” and the verb “benefits” (which takes “human health” as its direct
object). We ask whether “benefits human health” is a mechanistic action or
effect of the ITEM “liver”, to which we answer no. As there are no other
dependencies that we can follow, we are not able to identify the EFFECT. We
now ask whether function is being used in the sense of To Work. To test this,
we substitute “liver function” with “a working liver” to obtain the sentence “A
working liver benefits human health”. As this sentence retains the meaning of
the original, we classify this instance as To Work.
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Figure 3: Examples of dependency grammar analysis. (A) Selected Effect;
(B) To Work; and (C) Description Incomplete: Effect Unspecified.
5.6 Description incomplete
Consider the sentence “The transcript shows evidence of purifying selection,
suggesting that it is functional.”6 (Figure 3C). Here function is an adjective
in the form of “functional”. There is a dependency between “functional” and
the pronoun “it” (via nsubj, nominal subject). The referent of “it” is “tran-
script” (the subject of the main clause whose finite verb is “shows”), which we
can designate as the ITEM. Next we must identify the EFFECT. The ITEM
“transcript” has a dependency with the transitive verb “shows”, which itself has
a dependency with “evidence of purifying selection” (through its direct object
“evidence” and the nominal modification of the latter by “of purifying selec-
tion”). We ask whether “shows evidence of purifying selection” is a mechanistic
action or effect of the ITEM “transcript”, to which we answer no. There is a
further dependency between the verb “suggesting” and the finite verb “shows”
(which recall has a dependency with the ITEM “transcript”). We can thus ask
whether “suggesting that it is functional” is a mechanistic action or effect of
the ITEM “transcript”, to which we also answer no. (We obtain “suggesting
that it is functional” from the fact that “suggesting” has a dependency relation
with “functional”, the latter of which has dependency relations of its own with
“that”, “it”, and “is”.) There are no more dependencies to explore, and as
6This is a simplified version of a sentence analysed by Keeling et. al. [7]. See instance 26
in our analysis of the usages from Keeling et. al..
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we are unable to identify the EFFECT, the next question we ask is whether
function is used in the sense of To Work. We can substitute “it is functional”
with “it works” to obtain “The transcript shows evidence of purifying selection,
suggesting that it works.” This modification alters the meaning of the original
sentence: in the original sentence, “functional” indicates that the ITEM has
a function not that the ITEM works (performs its function) as expected. We
thus classify this instance as Description Incomplete: EFFECT Unspecified.
This is a useful example to highlight the difference between utilising syntactic
relations over using intuition alone. At first glance, this statement seems to be
a clear-cut example of Selected Effect. Our analysis indicates, however, that it
is missing an EFFECT and is thus an incomplete (Selected Effect) description,
analogous to if the sentence in Figure 3A were the truncated statement “Zebra
stripes are functional as [because] they evolved”.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a classification scheme for analysing natural language about
biological function. There are two different components to our classification
scheme: (i) a decision flowchart and a set of categories for senses of function;
and (ii) natural language analysis guidelines to aid in identifying the variables
that determine the classification of a use of function (ITEM, EFFECT, etc.).
The decision flowchart and function categories are part of a framework that
can used as is or it can be modified for more specific purposes (see below for
how one might extend it to ecological functions). The natural analysis software
and guidelines are tools to help one analyse biological function. In some in-
stances, the natural language analysis may be inadequate—for example, where
the software incorrectly parses parts of speech or dependency relations, or where
ambiguity arises in complex syntactic constructions—and should be used to
supplement the intuition and expertise of an investigator rather than applied
blindly.
Our approach is centered around the analysis of individual sentences con-
taining a use of biological function. Since we focused on syntactic dependencies
and short-range semantic relations, this approach makes sense, but there are
also drawbacks. As the syntactic analysis is limited to sentences, our approach
cannot directly leverage information in other parts of a document for the pur-
poses of identifying the unpacked variables (ITEM, EFFECT, etc.). Neverthe-
less an investigator can use our method to analyse multiple sentences indepen-
dently or can use a less structured method to identify the variables elsewhere
in a manuscript. For example, the instance in Figure 3C, which we classified
as Description Incomplete: EFFECT Unspecified, could be classified as Se-
lected Effect if one could infer the transcript’s EFFECT from elsewhere in the
manuscript.
Our focus on classifying individual usages of biological function highlights
another consideration: the difference between how function is used in a single
instance and how function is used in a document overall. Scientific manuscripts
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referencing biological function typically have multiple instances of use. If one
wants to make a claim about how an author uses function in a document as a
whole, then one will either have to use an alternative approach to analyse the
document as a whole or will have to develop a (mathematical) function that
maps from the number of individual usages of different function senses to a
measure of overall document meaning.
For simplicity, we have ignored functions above the level of a Darwinian indi-
vidual (ecological functions). We encountered a number of these uses during the
development of our classification scheme (e.g. “ecological functioning”, “func-
tion of biodiversity”, and so on), but ultimately we decided to focus on biological
functions of individuals given the focus on philosophy of medicine. Ecological
functions could be added an as extension to our scheme by (i) widening the
definition of an ITEM (expanding beyond systems of Darwinian individuals to
systems of ecosystems); (ii) expanding the definition of SYSTEM to include
ecosystems; and (iii) including an additional decision point that considers the
level of the ITEM and SYSTEM. For example, an ecological counterpart of
Biological Role could be unpacked to “The function of ITEM is EFFECT in
SYSTEM ” where ITEM is a Darwinian individual (or group of Darwinian in-
dividuals) and SYSTEM is an ecosystem containing ITEM.
Our classification scheme could potentially be extended to take advantage
of high-throughput automation of references to function. This is a well-studied
(but extremely difficult) problem in natural language processing (NLP) known
as word-sense disambiguation. Some of the steps in the flowchart could be auto-
mated by rule-based programming that leverages our natural language analysis
pipeline (e.g. identifying ITEM ). Other steps, however, would be very difficult
to automate using rules. Consider the decision points for Selected Effect and
Biological Advantage. There are countless specific ways that an author might
indicate that an ITEM has been under selection or that an ITEM ’s EFFECT
benefits a SYSTEM, and a pure rule-based system is bound to perform poorly
in these cases. But these steps might still be automated by using a statistical,
rather than a rule-based, approach. For example, recent deep learning NLP
models based on the Transformer architecture can be “pre-trained” on a huge
corpus, allowing them to “learn” how to represent relationships in natural lan-
guage from unlabelled data [15] . Where a rule-based system would need a list
of all the words and phrases associated with “benefitting” a SYSTEM in order
to automate the Biological Advantage decision point (“improve”, “augment”,
and so on), a deep learning NLP model has a high-dimensional representation
of language that can reflect the similarities between these words without hav-
ing necessarily seen a similar sentence before. Some Transformer models have
been trained on a corpus of scientific manuscripts, allowing them to efficiently
represent the particularities of academic language and style. (For example, the
software we use to generate the dependency grammar analysis uses an NLP
Transformer architecture called SciBert [16] . NLP models trained on more
general-purpose text (e.g. Wikipedia) did much worse at representing grammar
relations for our examples.) The downside is that training these models for
specific downstream tasks (e.g. training an NLP model for the decision point
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between Biological Role and Biological Advantage) is a supervised learning prob-
lem, which requires labelled data (manually categorised sentences). Depending
on the difficulty of the problem, it can require a substantial amount of labelled
data (possibly thousands of manually categorised sentences), making this a se-
rious undertaking.
One of the main differences between our set of function categories and that of
Wouters (2003) [6] is the introduction of a category for To Work. With its focus
on whether token traits are “working as expected”, this sense of function is the
most relevant for philosophy of medicine and the naturalistic account of health
and disease. To Work statements require a normative basis to ground why one
should expect a trait to work in a certain way (i.e. perform its function). Some
normative bases will be explicit and well-justified; others might implicitly appeal
to vague, indefinable notions of why a trait should work in a certain way. Here
we have made no distinction between various normative bases behind function
in the sense of To Work. Adding these distinctions could be a fruitful way to
extend our framework. With such an extended framework in hand, one could
tackle some interesting questions in philosophy of medicine. One of many such
possibilities would be to analyse uses of To Work function in medical journals
to help understand the extent to which physicians and medical researchers use
different normative bases as a foundation for dysfunction and disease. More
generally, the methodology we have outlined can serve as a framework that
may be extended by experimental philosophers to analyse references to other
concepts in academic literature.
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